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STATE CONTRACT IMPAIRMENT CLAUSES AND THE 
VALIDITY OF CHAPTER 9 AUTHORIZATION 
ABSTRACT 
Although chapter 9 bankruptcy provides an opportunity for financially 
distressed municipalities to escape their debts, it also allows municipalities to 
impair their contractual obligations. The U.S. Constitution and most state 
constitutions, though, have a Contract Clause that prohibits states from 
passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. The U.S. Supreme Court 
has foreclosed the argument that chapter 9 bankruptcy violates the federal 
Contract Clause, but has not foreclosed the argument under the similar 
clauses of state constitutions. Chapter 9 requires a municipality to have state 
authorization before filing bankruptcy, and state courts have the authority to 
determine the constitutionality of a state authorization under their state 
constitutions. 
This Comment argues that, except for the rare circumstance where a 
municipality has absolutely no contractual obligations, state authorization of a 
municipal bankruptcy under chapter 9 violates a state constitution’s contract 
impairment clause. States have generally applied the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the federal Contract Clause to their own state clauses. 
However in the last century, the Supreme Court’s Contract Clause 
jurisprudence has become inconsistent with the text, purpose, and original 
interpretation of the clause. Thus, state courts should abandon this 
jurisprudence when interpreting their own clauses, and adopt a stricter 
standard more in line with the Court’s earlier decisions. Under such a 
standard it becomes clear that only municipalities without any contractual 
obligations should be authorized to file bankruptcy. By authorizing any other 
municipal bankruptcy filing, states violate their state constitutions’ contract 
impairment clauses. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the Great Depression, Detroit mayor Frank Murphy proclaimed, 
“This is a great, rich city . . . It never has repudiated an obligation nor 
defaulted upon a debt—and it never will.”1 Today, however, the city’s 
narrative looks quite different. In 2013, Detroit filed the largest municipal 
bankruptcy in U.S. history.2 Detroit was facing over 100,000 creditors and $18 
billion of debt, unfunded pensions, and healthcare liabilities.3 The city turned 
to the bankruptcy process to escape its financial distress, and ultimately the 
bankruptcy court accepted a plan that cut Detroit’s financial obligations by $7 
billion.4 However, Detroit had to overcome more than 100 legal objections to 
its filing before the bankruptcy process even began.5 One of these objections 
arose under the contract impairment clauses of the U.S. Constitution and 
Michigan’s constitution.6 
The Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution states: “No state shall . . . pass 
any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”7 Nevertheless, municipal 
bankruptcies, such as Detroit’s, allow municipalities, acting as subdivisions of 
the state with state authorization, to impair their contractual obligations.8 The 
Supreme Court, though, has foreclosed the argument that chapter 9 violates the 
Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution.9 However, most states have a similar 
clause that also prohibits the enactment of laws that impair contractual 
obligations.10 The Supreme Court has also rejected the argument that chapter 9 
 
 1 Nathan Boomey & John Gallagher, How Detroit Went Broke, DET. FREE PRESS (Sept. 15, 2013, 1:10 
AM), http://archive.freep.com/interactive/article/20130915/NEWS01/130801004/Detroit-Bankruptcy-history-
1950-debt-pension-revenue. 
 2 Alexander E.M. Hess et al., Largest Municipal Bankruptcies in U.S. History, 24/7 WALL ST. (July 19, 
2014 5:43 PM), http://247wallst.com/special-report/2013/07/19/the-largest-municipal-bankruptcies-in-u-s-
history/2/. 
 3 In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 191, 194 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013); Tom Hals, Detroit Hits Back 
Against Opposition to its Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2013, 11:19 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2013/09/07/us-usa-detroit-bankruptcy-idUSBRE98603X20130907. 
 4 See Monica Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Plan to Exit Bankruptcy Is Approved for Detroit,  
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2014, at A11; Mary Williams Walsh, Detroit Emerges from Bankruptcy, Yet Pension 
Risks Linger, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2014, at B1 [hereinafter Walsh, Detroit Emerges]. 
 5 See Hals, supra note 3 (“To proceed into bankruptcy, Detroit must overcome 109 objections filed in 
court . . . .”). 
 6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 10; see City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 231. 
 7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 8 See, e.g., In re City of Stockton, 478 B.R. 8, 16 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012). 
 9 See, e.g., United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 52–54 (1938); City of Stockton, 478 B.R. at 15–16. 
 10 See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No . . . law impairing the obligation of contract shall be 
enacted.”). 
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proceedings violate state constitution contract impairment clauses because of 
the supremacy of the federal bankruptcy power.11 Importantly though, the 
Court has not foreclosed the argument that state authorization of a chapter 9 
bankruptcy violates these contract impairment clauses.12 This precise issue 
arose in the Detroit bankruptcy. 
A Michigan trial court held in Webster v. Michigan that the law allowing 
the state’s governor to authorize Detroit’s bankruptcy filing was 
unconstitutional under Michigan’s constitution.13 The court held that P.A. 436, 
the law empowering the governor to authorize a chapter 9 filing, violated the 
state constitution “to the extent that it permits the Governor to authorize an 
emergency manager to proceed under chapter 9 in any manner which threatens 
to diminish or impair accrued pension benefits.”14  
Michigan’s constitution has both a Contract Clause and a similarly worded 
Pension Clause.15 Importantly, Michigan’s Pension Clause is no more powerful 
than its contract impairment clause.16 The Pension Clause simply makes clear 
that pensions are contracts, and, therefore, they have the same protection as all 
other contracts under the state’s contract impairment clause.17 Thus, the court’s 
holding in Webster was that the state’s contract impairment clause does not 
allow the authorization of a chapter 9 filing because it “threatens to diminish or 
impair” an existing contractual obligation.18 
However, the federal bankruptcy judge presiding over Detroit’s 
bankruptcy, Judge Rhodes, gave the Michigan court’s decision essentially no 
weight in considering the constitutional challenges to the bankruptcy.19 Judge 
 
 11 See Sturges v. Crowninsheld, 17 U.S. 122, 191 (1819); see also Ass’n of Retired Emp. v. City of 
Stockton (In re City of Stockton), 478 B.R. 8, 15 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012) (rejecting the argument that chapter 
9 proceedings violate state constitution contract impairment clauses). 
 12 See City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 191; Webster v. Michigan, No. 13-734, 2013 WL 3815679, at *1–2 
(Mich. Cir. Ct. July 19, 2013). 
 13 See City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 256–61; Webster, 2013 WL 3815679, at *1–2. 
 14 City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 258; Webster, 2013 WL 3815679, at *1–2. 
 15 MICH. CONST. art. I, § 10; MICH. CONST. art. 9 § 24 (“The accrued financial benefits of each pension 
plan and retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be a contractual obligation thereof 
which shall not be diminished or impaired thereby.”). 
 16 See City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 244; see also Alexander Volokh, Pension Protection and the Detroit 
Bankruptcy, REASON FOUND. (Apr. 2, 2014), http://reason.org/news/show/volokh-detroit-pension-protection 
[hereinafter Volokh, Pension Protection]. 
 17 See City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 244; see also Volokh, Pension Protection, supra note 16. 
 18 City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 258; Webster, 2013 WL 3815679, at *1–2. 
 19 See City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 256–61; see also Alexander Volokh, Pension Protection, supra note 
16. 
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Rhodes voided the Michigan decision because it was filed after Detroit had 
filed its bankruptcy petition20 and held that the “fundamental reason” to void 
the decision was that the Michigan court lacked jurisdiction.21 Once a petition 
has been filed, the bankruptcy court has “exclusive jurisdiction to determine all 
issues related to the City’s eligibility to be a chapter 9 debtor.”22 
Judge Rhodes determined that Detroit’s bankruptcy was constitutional 
under both the U.S. Constitution and Michigan’s constitution.23 He held that 
pension rights are contractual rights and that contractual rights could be 
impaired when the state has consented to chapter 9 bankruptcy.24 However, he 
did not independently consider if the state’s authorization violated Michigan’s 
contract impairment clause.25 Judge Rhodes’s decision left this very important 
question unresolved.26 
This Comment will address head-on the issue that the bankruptcy court in 
Detroit punted, and show why the Michigan trial court’s opinion that it voided 
was actually correct. First, this Comment will provide a brief history of 
municipal bankruptcies and their relevance today. Ultimately, the Analysis 
section of this Comment will show that state constitutional contract 
impairment clauses prohibit state authorization of chapter 9 bankruptcy filings, 
except in the very rare cases of municipalities with absolutely no contractual 
obligations.27 Section I of the Analysis will show that state constitutions have 
the power to prohibit a state from authorizing a chapter 9 filing. Section II will 
show that state courts should abandon federal Contract Clause jurisprudence 
and adopt a stricter standard when interpreting state constitutions’ contract 
impairment clauses. Section III will establish such a standard and apply it to 
state authorization of chapter 9 bankruptcies. Section IV will argue that from a 
policy perspective, this constitutional guarantee should trump the potential 
effectiveness of municipal bankruptcy. The Conclusion of this Comment will 
discuss the proper course of action for states going forward, including 
constitutional amendments and alternatives to municipal bankruptcy. 
 
 20 See City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 258–59. 
 21 See id. 
 22 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2012); City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 258–59. 
 23 See City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 243–61. 
 24 Id. at 244. 
 25 See id. at 258–59; see also Volokh, Pension Protection, supra note 16. 
 26 See City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 244. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Municipal Bankruptcy Proceedings and Limitations 
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code allows financially distressed 
municipalities to seek protection from their creditors while they formulate a 
plan to adjust their debts.28 A chapter 9 bankruptcy is similar to a chapter 11 
reorganization, but with a few notable distinctions due to limitations imposed 
on the federal bankruptcy power by the Tenth Amendment’s29 protections of 
state sovereignty.30 Municipalities are only “department[s] of the State, and the 
State may withhold, grant or withdraw powers as it sees fit.”31 Thus, Congress 
had to accommodate Tenth Amendment limitations in the Bankruptcy Code, 
which caused chapter 9 to have some unique characteristics.32 
Unlike chapter 11 debtors, municipalities are not allowed to liquidate their 
assets in order to satisfy their debts, and, therefore, cannot be forced into a 
chapter 7 liquidation33 by the bankruptcy judge.34 Municipalities also can only 
enter bankruptcy voluntarily; involuntary petitions are never allowed.35 Also, 
very different than chapter 11 bankruptcy, the court’s power is highly 
constrained in a chapter 9 bankruptcy.36 Without the municipality’s consent, 
the court cannot interfere with any of the municipality’s “political or 
governmental powers,” “property or revenues,” or “use or enjoyment of any 
income-producing property.”37 As later discussed in Part C of the Background, 
 
 28 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.) (“The 
purpose of chapter 9 legislation is to permit a financially distressed public entity to seek protection from its 
creditors while it formulates and negotiates a plan for adjustment of its debts . . . and to provide the mechanism 
by which the plan that is acceptable to the majority of creditors can be made binding on a recalcitrant and 
dissenting minority.”). 
 29 U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”). 
 30 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012); see also Jonathan J. Spitz, Federalism, States, and the Power to Regulate 
Municipal Bankruptcies, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 621, 623–26 (1993). 
 31 City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923); see also Spitz, supra note 30, at 630. 
 32 See Spitz, supra note 30, at 623–27. 
 33 See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 28, at ¶ 700.01. 
 34 See id. at ¶ 900.01 (“Municipal debt adjustment is unlike that for individuals or private corporations. 
Because of the public nature of the entity experiencing financial difficulties, there is no provision in the law for 
liquidation of its assets and distribution of the proceeds to creditors.”). 
 35 See id. at ¶ 900.02 (“[A] municipality is not subject to an involuntary petition.”); Spitz, supra note 30, 
at 626. 
 36 See 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012); see also Spitz, supra note 30, at 626. 
 37 11 U.S.C. § 904; see also Spitz, supra note 30, at 626. 
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the most important distinction for the purposes of this Comment is that a 
municipality cannot file for bankruptcy without state authorization.38 
Despite the distinguishing rules, the general purpose of chapter 9 remains 
essentially the same as reorganization under chapter 11.39 As the Bankruptcy 
Court stated in In re Addison Community Hospital Authority, “The general 
policy considerations underlying the municipal debt adjustment plan of 
Chapter 9 are the same as that of Chapter 11 reorganization: to give the debtor 
a breathing spell from debt collection efforts and establish a repayment plan 
with creditors.”40 
B. Relevance of Municipal Bankruptcy 
Municipal bankruptcies are more relevant today than they have been at any 
other point in U.S. history.41 Historically, municipal bankruptcies have been 
quite rare,42 and many bankruptcy casebooks barely even cover the topic.43 
Recently, though, municipal bankruptcy has become a much more relevant 
issue. Municipalities filed nearly twice as many chapter 9 bankruptcies in the 
last five years as in the preceding five years.44 In 2012, a record number of 
chapter 9 bankruptcies were filed.45 More important than the quantity increase, 
though, is that municipal bankruptcies have become larger than ever.46 Since 
2011, Jefferson County, Alabama; San Bernardino, California; Stockton, 
California; and Detroit, Michigan, have filed four of the five largest municipal 
bankruptcies in U.S. history.47 The bankruptcies of Detroit, Jefferson County, 
and San Bernardino all exceeded $1 billion.48 
 
 38 See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (“An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 . . . only if such entity . . . is 
specifically authorized . . . to be a debtor under such chapter by State law, or by a governmental officer or 
organization empowered by State law to authorize such entity to be a debtor under such chapter.”); see also 6 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 28, at ¶ 900.02. 
 39 See 175 B.R. 646, 648–49 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994). 
 40 Id. 
 41 See Chapter 9 Quarterly Filings (1980–2014), AM. BANKR. INST. (2014), http://abi-org.s3.amazonaws. 
com/Newsroom/Bankruptcy_Statistics/Chapter9Filings-Thru2Q2014.pdf; Hess et al., supra note 2. 
 42 See Elizabeth M. Watkins, In Defense of the Chapter 9 Option, 39 J. LEGIS. 89, 90 (2013). 
 43 See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS (6th ed. 
2009).  
 44 See AM. BANKR. INST., supra note 41. 
 45 See id. 
 46 See Hess et al., supra note 2. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
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As a matter of policy, many of the municipal bankruptcies have been 
heavily scrutinized.49 Opponents of chapter 9 bankruptcy filings usually argue 
that the filing will damage the city’s reputation and result in a credit 
downgrade that will increase the government’s future borrowing costs.50  
The major concern for state officials is that “local credit problems can have 
a statewide ripple effect.”51 State officials’ concerns have led to some heated 
political battles.52 In 2011, the governor of Alabama, Robert Bentley, strongly 
opposed Jefferson County’s $4 billion bankruptcy filing, and became involved 
in “months of intense settlement negotiations” prior to the filing in order to 
avoid bankruptcy.53 After the city filed, Governor Bentley referred to the 
bankruptcy as an “embarrassing situation,” and stated: “[A]t some point, you 
have to step up and have to be a leader and have to be a statesman and you 
have to do what’s right. Bankruptcy is not right.”54  
Another example arose in Pennsylvania’s capital city, Harrisburg.55 In 
2011, the city council of Harrisburg voted to file bankruptcy despite opposition 
from both the state’s governor and the city’s mayor.56 The state went on to pass 
legislation preventing the city from filing bankruptcy, which ultimately led to 
the city’s case being dismissed by the bankruptcy court.57 
C. The Constitutionality of Municipal Bankruptcy Under the Federal 
Constitution 
Challenges to municipal bankruptcies have extended beyond the political 
arena and into courts with several recent bankruptcies being challenged on 
 
 49 See Mary Williams Walsh, Alabama Governor Fails to Prevent County’s Record $4 Billion 
Bankruptcy Filing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2011, at A16 [hereinafter Walsh, Alabama Governor]; Sabrina 
Tavernise, Governor Moves to Take Fiscal Control of Pennsylvania’s Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2011, at 
A25; Monica Davey, Michigan Town Is Left Pleading for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2010, at A1. 
 50 See John Gramlich, Municipal Bankruptcy Explained, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Nov. 22, 2011), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2011/11/22/municipal-bankruptcy-
explained-what-it-means-to-file-for-chapter-9; Tavernise, supra note 49. 
 51 Gramlich, supra note 50. 
 52 See Walsh, Alabama Governor, supra note 49; Tavernise, supra note 49; Davey, supra note 49. 
 53 Dawn Kent Azok, Jefferson County Bankruptcy Called Disheartening, Inevitable, AL.COM (Nov. 10, 
2011, 8:20 AM), http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2011/11/jefferson_county_bankruptcy_fi_1.html; see also 
Walsh, Alabama Governor, supra note 49 (discussing Jefferson County’s $4 billion bankruptcy filing). 
 54 Azok, supra note 53. 
 55 See Tavernise, supra note 49. 
 56 See id. 
 57 See In re City of Harrisburg, 465 B.R. 744, 763 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011). 
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constitutional grounds.58 Opponents of municipal bankruptcy filings have 
frequently attempted to make the legal argument that chapter 9 violates the 
Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution because the bankruptcy proceedings 
allow impairment of contractual obligations.59 However, this argument has 
very little weight. The Contract Clause by its very terms applies only to states, 
not Congress.60 Thus, since chapter 9 is part of the Bankruptcy Code passed by 
Congress, it is clearly consistent with the U.S. Constitution.61 
 Chapter 9 itself may not violate the Contract Clause, but what about state 
authorization of a chapter 9 filing? Unlike chapter 9, state authorization is a 
state action, and, therefore, the Contract Clause should be applicable. 
However, the Supreme Court has foreclosed the argument that states violate 
the U.S. Constitution by allowing their municipalities to file for bankruptcy.62 
In United States v. Bekins, the Supreme Court held that it did not violate the 
U.S. Constitution for states to authorize a municipal bankruptcy.63 Prior to 
Bekins, the Court had struck down Congress’s original municipal bankruptcy 
legislation in Ashton v. Cameron Cty. Water Improvement Dist. because it 
improperly interfered with state sovereignty.64 The Court noted that if states 
could not manage their own affairs, “the will of Congress” would prevail over 
them and “the sovereignty of the state, so often declared necessary to the 
federal system” would not exist.65 Congress revised the act providing “a 
modest increase in the protection of states’ sovereignty.”66 However, the Court 
upheld the revised Act in Bekins. The Court refused to “hold that the 
Constitution had rendered both the states and the federal government helpless 
to alleviate the problem” of the nation’s municipal debt crisis, but stressed that 
municipalities needed state authorization before a court could approve a 
readjustment plan.67 
 
 58 See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 191, 194 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013); Ass’n of Retired Emp. v. 
City of Stockton (In re City of Stockton), 478 B.R. 8, 15–16 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012); In re City of Vallejo, 
432 B.R. 262, 269 (E.D. Cal. 2010), aff’g 403 B.R. 72 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009). 
 59 See, e.g., City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 194–95; City of Stockton, 478 B.R. at 13–15. 
 60 City of Stockton, 478 B.R. at 15. 
 61 See id. See generally Volokh, Pension Protection, supra note 16.  
 62 See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 52–54 (1938). 
 63 See id. at 51–54. 
 64 298 U.S. 513, 530 (1936); see also 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 28, at ¶ 900.LH; Spitz, 
supra note 30, at 623 (discussing how Congress’s original bankruptcy legislation was struck down). 
 65 Ashton, 298 U.S. at 530. 
 66 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 28, at 900.LH. 
 67 Bekins, 304 U.S. at 51–54. 
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Thus, the law is settled that chapter 9 and state authorization are both 
consistent with the U.S. Constitution, but the issue of whether chapter 9 and 
state authorization are consistent with state constitutions remains unsettled. 
Importantly, though, federal bankruptcy power under the Bankruptcy Clause68 
of the U.S. Constitution trumps any state constitutional provision because of 
the Supremacy Clause.69 In other words, once the municipality has entered into 
bankruptcy, state constitutions cannot limit the federal bankruptcy power.70 
Therefore, while federal bankruptcy proceedings under chapter 9 are a tool that 
allows a state to impair contractual obligations, the proceedings themselves are 
not inconsistent with a state constitution’s contract impairment clause because 
state constitutions cannot invalidate federal law. 
Chapter 9 proceedings, then, do not violate state constitutional contract 
impairment clauses, but the inquiry does not end here. Chapter 9 forecloses 
any proceeding unless the state authorizes the municipal bankruptcy filing, and 
that authorization could still be inconsistent with the state constitution.71 The 
mere fact that Congress has a bankruptcy power does not mandate that states 
authorize chapter 9 filings; to the contrary, chapter 9 explicitly leaves the 
decision to the state, and a state can choose not to file either by failing to pass 
an authorization statute, by passing a statute barring chapter 9 filings, or by 
tying its hands with its own constitution.72 Bekins closes the door on this 
argument under the U.S. Constitution, but not under state constitutions.73 
When interpreting a state constitutional provision, Supreme Court precedent 
does not bind state courts, even if the provisions have exactly the same 
language.74 
 
 68 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on 
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”). 
 69 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made 
in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 70 See County of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re County of Orange), 191 B.R. 1005, 1021 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. 1996) (“By authorizing the use of chapter 9 by its municipalities, California must accept chapter 9 in 
its totality; it cannot cherry pick what it likes while disregarding the rest. The right to discharge is not a benefit 
without burdens.”). 
 71 See 11 U.S.C.§ 109(c) (2012). 
 72 See In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 76 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 432 B.R. 262, 267 (E.D. Cal. 
2010) (holding that after a state has authorized a municipal bankruptcy filing, the federal bankruptcy power 
trumps state law). 
 73 See 304 U.S. 27, 52–54 (1938). 
 74 See Wilson Banking Co. Liquidating Corp. v. Colvard, 161 So. 123, 127 (Miss. 1935) (“[D]ecisions of 
the Supreme Court of the United States construing provisions of the federal Constitution are not binding on a 
state court construing similar provisions of its own state constitution.”); see also First Trust Co. of Lincoln v. 
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The law is well settled that chapter 9 and state authorization of chapter 9 is 
consistent with the U.S. Constitution.75 Furthermore, chapter 9 cannot violate 
state constitutions because the federal bankruptcy power trumps state law.76 
The federal bankruptcy power, however, does not extend to state authorization, 
which is a function of state law.77 The only issue addressed in this Comment, 
then, is whether state legislation authorizing or permitting the authorization of 
municipal bankruptcies violates the contract impairment clauses of state 
constitutions.  
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Power of State Constitutions to Prohibit Authorization of Chapter 9 Filings 
In their role as the “gatekeepers” to chapter 9 bankruptcy, states maintain 
the power to prohibit municipalities from filing bankruptcy.78 The 
metaphorical gates to bankruptcy are opened through authorization by a state 
or state official.79 Therefore, a state’s power to prohibit municipalities from 
filing bankruptcy must also include the power to prohibit authorization of a 
municipal bankruptcy. This power has been clearly illustrated in the state of 
Georgia.80 
The Georgia legislature has expressly forbidden municipalities from filing 
bankruptcy and state officials from authorizing a municipal bankruptcy.81 
Georgia law prohibits any “county, municipality, school district, authority, 
division, instrumentality, political subdivision, or public body corporate” from 
filing “a petition for relief from payments of its debts.”82 The same statute also 
prohibits granting any government official, governing body, or organization 
the power to “authorize . . . any county, municipality, school district, authority, 
division, instrumentality, political subdivision, or public body corporate 
 
Smith, 277 N.W. 762, 763 (Neb. 1938); Commonwealth v. Wilkins, 138 N.E. 11, 13 (Mass. 1923); State v. 
Chin Gim, 224 P. 798, 800 (Nev. 1924). 
 75 See, e.g., Ass’n of Retired Emp. v. City of Stockton (In re City of Stockton), 478 B.R. 8, 15–16 
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012). 
 76 See, e.g., City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. at 76. 
 77 See, e.g., id. 
 78 See In re City of Vallejo, 432 B.R. 262, 267 (E.D. Cal. 2010), aff’g 403 B.R. 72 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 
2009); see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 903, 904 (2012). 
 79 See City of Vallejo, 432 B.R. at 267–68. 
 80 See GA. CODE ANN. § 36-80-5 (2014). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
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created under the Constitution or laws of this state . . . [from] tak[ing] 
advantage of any federal statute providing for the adjustment of debts.”83 
Georgia is not alone in restricting municipalities’ access to chapter 9.84 
Several states have passed legislation authorizing municipalities to file 
bankruptcy, but only after getting approval from an authorized state official.85 
For example, Kentucky requires approval “by the state local debt officer and 
the state local finance officer,”86 and Louisiana requires approval by the 
governor and the Attorney General before the petition can be filed.87 
As mentioned in the Background, Pennsylvania has also passed legislative 
restrictions on chapter 9 access.88 When the City Council of Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania, voted to file bankruptcy over the objections of the mayor and 
governor, the state took legislative action.89 The state passed an amendment 
known as “Act 26” to Pennsylvania’s Fiscal Code.90 Without the passage of 
Act 26, the city would have likely had state authorization to file.91 Act 26, 
however, provided that “no distressed city may file a petition for relief under 
[chapter 9] or any other Federal bankruptcy law, and no government agency 
may authorize the distressed city to become a debtor under [chapter 9] or any 
other Federal bankruptcy law.”92 The amendment only applies to “third class” 
cities, and, therefore, is not nearly as restrictive as the Georgia law. 
Nevertheless, the law still significantly restricts municipal bankruptcy access, 
evidenced by the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of Harrisburg’s case.93 
 
 83 Id. 
 84 See Spitz, supra note 30, at 631 (noting that many states have authorized their municipalities to file 
bankruptcy but are subject to various conditions). 
 85 See id. at 631–32. 
 86 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66.400 (West 2014) (“No county shall file a petition as provided in the Federal 
Bankruptcy Act unless the proposed plan is first approved by the state local debt officer and the state local 
finance officer.”). 
 87 LA. STAT. ANN. § 39:619 (2014) (“No political subdivision . . . municipality . . . or other taxing district, 
shall, without the consent, approval and authority of the state through the governor and the Attorney General, 
file any petition in any court of the United States for confirmation of any plan of readjustment of its  
debts . . . .”). 
 88 See In re City of Harrisburg, 465 B.R. 744, 763 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011); John J. Ripsardi et al., A 
Study in State Law Barriers to Ch. 9, LAW360 (Jan. 30, 2012, 2:02 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/ 
304071/a-study-in-state-law-barriers-to-ch-9. 
 89 See Ripsardi et al., supra note 88. 
 90 See City of Harrisburg, 465 B.R. at 750, 755; Ripsardi et al., supra note 88. 
 91 See City of Harrisburg, 465 B.R. at 750, 755; Ripsardi et al., supra note 88. 
 92 City of Harrisburg, 465 B.R. at 755; Ripsardi et al., supra note 88. 
 93 City of Harrisburg, 465 B.R. at 755; Ripsardi et al., supra note 88. 
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It is clear that states have the power to pass statutes to limit and even 
completely prohibit filing and authorizing the filing of any chapter 9 
bankruptcy.94 It should be equally as clear, then, that states may also limit and 
prohibit filing and authorization of chapter 9 bankruptcy through their 
constitutions. The contract impairment clauses of state constitutions should be 
read as an implicit exercise of that power. 
B. State Constitutions’ Contract Impairment Clauses Should Be Interpreted 
Strictly 
The Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution states, “No State shall . . . 
pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”95 As already 
established, this clause of the Constitution is consistent with chapter 9 
bankruptcy;96 however, most states have similar clauses in their own 
constitutions.97 In general, state courts interpret the contract impairment clause 
of their state constitutions similarly to the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the federal Contract Clause.98 State courts should change this practice. They 
have the ability to adopt a stricter interpretation, and should do so because the 
Supreme Court’s current Contract Clause jurisprudence is no longer consistent 
with the clause’s text, original interpretation, or original purpose.99  
1. Text of the Contract Clause 
The text of the Contract Clause simply states that states shall pass “no Law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”100 The current Contract Clause 
standard allows a state to substantially impair contracts “so long as the 
impairment is reasonable and necessary.”101 However, the text in both the 
 
 94 See GA. CODE ANN. § 36-80-5 (2014). 
 95 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 96 See, e.g., United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 52–54 (1938); Ass’n of Retired Emp. v. City of 
Stockton (In re City of Stockton), 478 B.R. 8, 15 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012). 
 97 See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No . . . law impairing the obligation of contract shall be 
enacted.”); see also GEORGE D. BRADEN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED 
AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 62 (1977) (noting thirty-seven other state constitutions had contract impairment 
clauses). 
 98 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. v. Kim, 829 A.2d 611, 624 (Md. 2003); see also ALEXANDER VOLOKH, 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y, OVERPROTECTING PUBLIC EMPLOYEE PENSIONS 6 (2013), http://reason.org/files/ 
overprotecting_pensions_california_rule.pdf [hereinafter VOLOKH, OVERPROTECTING PUBLIC]. 
 99 See Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703 
(1984); see also James W. Ely, Jr., Whatever Happened to the Contract Clause?, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 371 
(2009). 
 100 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 101 Eric M. Madiar, Public Pension Benefits Under Siege, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 179, 186 (2012). 
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federal Contract Clause and the similarly worded state contract impairment 
clauses includes nothing about the reasonableness or the necessity of the law 
impairing contractual obligations.102 The clauses also do not include the use of 
any form of the word “substantial.”103 
When a law lacks ambiguity, the courts should look no further than the text 
for interpretation.104 As the Supreme Court stated in Connecticut National 
Bank v. Germain, “courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what 
it means and means in a statute what it says there . . . When the words of a 
statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry 
is complete.”105 The Contract Clause is quite clear when it states “no Law shall 
be passed” and, therefore, it would be improper for courts to redefine the 
clause to read “no unreasonable or unnecessary Law shall be passed.”106 Even 
if the courts are going to read more language into the Contract Clause, the 
absolute language of the text should still demand a strict interpretation. The 
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,107 for example, has not been read as 
an absolute bar on laws abridging the freedom of speech or press; however, the 
Supreme Court has still treated First Amendment protections as fundamental 
rights.108 The Contract Clause should be given similar respect. 
If the clause does contain any ambiguities, they are in areas of the text that 
are either addressed or not at issue in this Comment. Specifically, the words 
“impairing,” “Obligation,” and “Contracts” are all undefined.109 The issue of 
what constitutes a contract has little relevance here. Primarily, this is an issue 
within a municipal bankruptcy, but could be relevant to the extent that one 
 
 102 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No . . . law impairing the 
obligation of contract shall be enacted.”). 
 103 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No . . . law impairing the 
obligation of contract shall be enacted.”). 
 104 See, e.g., Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992); Nat’l Tax Credit Partners v. Havlik, 
20 F.3d 705, 707 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 105 503 U.S. at 253–54 (quotation marks omitted). 
 106 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No . . . law impairing the 
obligation of contract shall be enacted.”); Germain, 503 U.S. at 253–54. 
 107 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”). 
 108 See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (“Freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press, which are protected by the First Amendment from infringement by Congress, are among the 
fundamental personal rights and liberties which are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by 
state action.”). 
 109 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see also Epstein, supra note 99. 
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could argue no “Contracts” are impaired through municipal bankruptcies.110 
This argument is addressed in Section III, where it is shown that state courts 
should presume contract impairment will take place in the bankruptcy 
proceedings. Thus, Section III also addresses any relevant ambiguity regarding 
the word “impairing.”111 For the purposes of municipal bankruptcy, the 
municipality must have some obligations or it would not be seeking relief 
through bankruptcy, and, therefore, any ambiguity with the word “Obligation” 
is not at issue in this Comment.112 
Thus, the text of the Contract Clause clearly supports a stricter 
interpretation. Even if a court managed to read some ambiguity into the “no 
Law shall be passed” language of the clause,113 the court would still need to 
resolve the ambiguity.114 The most appropriate manner of resolving the 
ambiguity would be to understand the original purpose and intent of the 
clause.115 As the following Sections will show, the original interpretations of 
the Contract Clause and the framers’ purpose and intent also strongly support a 
strict interpretation of the clause.  
2. The Original Interpretation of the Contract Clause 
Until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Supreme Court 
had a very strict interpretation of the Contract Clause.116 During the 1800’s the 
Court overturned numerous state statutes that attempted to impair contractual 
obligations.117 Then the Supreme Court made a dramatic shift away from 
earlier precedent, which culminated in a 1934 case allowing Minnesota to 
impair contractual obligations in order to protect the public in a time of 
financial emergency.118   
The Contract Clause was once considered to be “one of the most beneficial 
provisions of the Federal Constitution.”119 In an 1877 Supreme Court opinion, 
 
 110 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 See, e.g., id. 10 (“No . . . law impairing the obligation of contract shall be enacted.”). 
 114 See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892); William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 628–29 (1990). 
 115 See Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 459; Eskridge, Jr., supra note 114.  
 116 See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 464–83 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting); 
Ely, Jr., supra note 99, at 371–76. 
 117 See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 464–83 (Sutherland, J., dissenting); Ely, Jr., supra note 99, at 371–76. 
 118 See Ely, Jr., supra note 99, at 388–89.  
 119 Wash. Univ. v. Rouse, 75 U.S. 439, 442 (1869) (Miller, J., dissenting); see also Ely, Jr., supra note 99, 
at 375.  
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Justice William Strong stated: “There is no more important provision in the 
Federal Constitution than the one which prohibits states from passing laws 
impairing the obligation of contracts, and it is one of the highest duties of this 
court to take care the prohibition shall neither be evaded nor frittered away.”120 
Until 1934, the law was settled that any attempt to shift the “misfortune of 
the debtor to the shoulders of the creditors” would conflict with the Contract 
Clause.121 The Contract Clause did not just extend to private contracts, but 
applied to contracts between states and individuals as well.122 Under Justice 
Marshall in the early nineteenth century, the Supreme Court applied “the 
provision to tax-exemption agreements, grants of corporate charters, land 
grants, agreements between states, and state insolvency laws.”123 
The Supreme Court’s view of the Contract Clause has diminished 
significantly since that time. In the late nineteenth century, the Court began 
pulling in the reins on the Contract Clause by ruling that states could not 
contract away their police and eminent domain powers.124 The trend of eroding 
Contract Clause power carried into the twentieth century, which led to the 
“near-fatal punch” of the Blaisdell decision in 1934.125 
During the Great Depression, the state of Minnesota passed a “statute 
imposing a two-year moratorium on mortgage foreclosures to stop massive 
home losses.”126 In Blaisdell, the Supreme Court upheld the state’s statute.127 
The Court’s decision “established the basic standard that a state may 
substantially impair private contracts so long as the impairment is reasonable 
and necessary to serve an important public purpose identified by the 
legislature.”128 This standard from Blaisdell signaled the significant shift in the 
Supreme Court’s protection of contractual agreements and opened the doors 
for courts to allow public policy to outweigh contract rights.129 
Justice Sutherland’s dissent in Blaisdell refused to accept the majority’s 
change of attitude regarding the Contract Clause and explained that the 
 
 120 Murray v. City of Charleston, 96 U.S. 432, 448 (1877); see also Ely, Jr., supra note 99, at 376. 
 121 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 465–72 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
 122 See Ely, Jr., supra note 99, at 374. 
 123 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 124 See id. at 387. 
. 125 Id. at 388; see also VOLOKH, OVERPROTECTING PUBLIC, supra note 98. 
 126 Madiar, supra note 101. 
 127 See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447–48 (1934); Madiar, supra note 101. 
 128 Madiar, supra note 101, at 186. 
 129 See Ely, Jr., supra note 99, at 392–94. 
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majority was disregarding the original understanding of the provision.130 
Justice Sutherland referenced a long line of cases holding invalid similar 
statutes, including Bronson v. Kinzie.131  
Kinzie is an 1843 case in which the Supreme Court invalidated the 
application of two Illinois statutes to existing mortgages.132 The statutes 
extended the period of redemption after a sale and prevented “a sale unless 
two-thirds of the amount at which the property had been valued by appraisers 
should be bid therefor.”133 The Court held those statutes violated the Contract 
Clause, even though they were passed during a time of substantial financial 
emergency.134 The result of the case was quite controversial, and even led to an 
Illinois senator proposing a constitutional amendment that would prevent the 
Supreme Court from “declaring void any Act of Congress or any State 
regulation on the ground that it is contrary to the Constitution of the United 
States.”135 Nevertheless, as Charles Warren noted in his book, The Supreme 
Court in United States History, the Court “maintained its firm stand in behalf 
of high standards of business morale, requiring honest payment of debts and 
strict performance of contracts.”136 Justice Sutherland went on to discuss 
several other cases that followed Kinzie and further supported a stricter 
Contract Clause standard.137 
Thus, the original interpretations of the Contract Clause were clearly 
stricter than the Supreme Court’s interpretation today. The Supreme Court 
acknowledged this fact in U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey when it 
noted that in the “early years” the Contract Clause was “regarded as an 
absolute bar to any impairment.”138 The Court has undoubtedly come quite a 
long way from the “early years” to the current “reasonable and necessary” 
 
 130 See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 448–83 (Sutherland, J., dissenting); Ely, Jr., supra note 99, at 390. 
 131 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 465–72 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting); Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. 311, 311–
21 (1843). 
 132 Kinzie, 42 U.S. at 311–13, 320–21; Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 466 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
 133 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 466 (Sutherland, J., dissenting); Kinzie, 42 U.S. at 311–13. 
 134 Kinzie, 42 U.S. at 311–13, 320–21; Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 466 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (“The 
opinion of the court says nothing about an emergency; but it is clear that the statute was passed for the purpose 
of meeting the panic and depression which began in 1837 and continued for some years thereafter.”). 
 135 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 379 (1922) (quotation marks 
omitted); see also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 466 (1934) (Sutherland, J., 
dissenting). 
 136 2 WARREN, supra note 135; see also Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 466 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
 137 See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 466–72 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
 138 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.17 (1977). 
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standard.139 State courts should use the early decisions as a guiding light for 
resolving any ambiguity of the contract impairment clauses as they are one of 
the best indicators of the provision’s purpose.140 
3. The Framers’ Intent and Purpose 
A consideration of the surrounding circumstances along with the opinions 
expressed by the Framers supports a strict interpretation of the Contract 
Clause. The Supreme Court correctly noted in Blaisdell that the debates at the 
Constitutional Convention provide “little aid” in determining the Framers’ 
intent, but that does not mean that they should be disregarded.141 When 
interpreting a provision of the Constitution, the Framers’ intent is often a 
central focus of the inquiry, and should not be cast aside just because the 
debates of the Convention have little fruit.142 The courts should also look to 
“[t]he necessities which gave rise to the provision, the controversies which 
preceded, as well as the conflicts of opinion which were settled by its 
adoption” in considering the intent of the framers.143 
First, the situation surrounding the adoption of the Contract Clause 
suggests the Framers intended it to be read strictly. After the Revolutionary 
War and before the Constitution was adopted, most Americans were 
financially impoverished.144 Because of the circumstances, many “incurred 
indebtedness in the purchase of imported goods and otherwise far beyond their 
capacity to pay.”145 In response to the situation, states passed a variety of laws, 
including stay laws, laws limiting access to courts, and laws that discriminated 
against British creditors.146 “Debtors, instead of seeking to meet their 
obligations by painful effort, by industry and economy, began to rest their 
hopes entirely upon legislative interference.”147 
 
 139 Id. 
 140 See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 427 (“In the construction of the contract clause, the debates in the 
Constitutional Convention are of little aid . . . . To ascertain the scope of the constitutional prohibition, we 
examine the course of judicial decisions in its application.”). 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 454 (“Following the Revolution, and prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the American 
people found themselves in a greatly impoverished condition. Their commerce had been well-nigh 
annihilated.”). 
 145 Id. 
 146 See id. at 454–58; Epstein, supra note 99, at 706. 
 147 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 455 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
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With that situation in the background, the Framers adopted the Contract 
Clause.148 The adoption came over the objections of many who believed it was 
too restrictive.149 George Mason expressed concerns that cases would happen 
“that could not be foreseen where some kind of interference would be 
essential.”150 Luther Martin voted against the provision for a similar reason.151 
Martin believed there could “be times of such great public calamity and 
distress as should render it the duty of a government in some measure to 
interfere.”152 Martin said the regulations were necessary in most states “to 
prevent the wealthy creditor and the moneyed man from totally destroying the 
poor, though industrious debtor.”153 He feared that “[s]uch times may again 
arrive,” and did not think that states should be stripped of their power to give 
debtors the necessary and desirous “moment’s indulgence.”154 
The Framers that supported the provision also spoke of it in a manner that 
suggested a strict and perhaps even an absolute interpretation.155 James 
Madison wrote that “[o]ne legislative interference is but the first link of a long 
chain of repetitions, every subsequent interference being naturally produced by 
the effects of the preceding.”156 He declared that the “laws impairing the 
obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social 
compact, and to every principle of sound legislation.”157 He further concluded 
that the Contract Clause was a “constitutional bulwark in favor of personal 
security and private rights” that would “banish speculations on public 
measures” and “inspire a general prudence.”158 
From these opinions and the circumstances prompting the adoption of the 
Contract Clause, it is quite difficult to imagine the Framers intended it to be 
interpreted in today’s fashion. The purpose of the clause was undoubtedly 
 
 148 See id. at 459. 
 149 See id. at 461–62. 
 150 Id. at 461. 
 151 Id. at 461–62. 
 152 Id. at 462. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 155 See id. at 427 (“Randolph declared that the prohibition would be promotive of virtue and justice . . . 
and the reputation of the people had suffered because of frequent interferences by the state legislature . . . .Mr. 
Davie . . . thought the constitutional provisions were founded on the strongest principles of justice . . . . 
Pinckney . . . said that he considered the section including the clause in question as the soul of the 
Constitution.”) (quotation marks omitted). 
 156 Id. at 464. 
 157 Ely, Jr., supra note 99, at 373.  
 158 Id. 
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meant to be much broader. In particular, it is quite clear that the Framers 
intended for the provision to apply even to “reasonable” laws passed by state 
legislatures that deemed them “necessary.”159 The Framers’ intent appears to 
clearly support a strict reading of the provision, in accordance with the original 
interpretations of the Contract Clause.160 
4. States Should Adopt a Stricter Standard 
State courts should adopt a stricter interpretation of their state 
constitutions’ contract impairment clauses than the Supreme Court’s current 
interpretation of the federal Contract Clause. While the Supreme Court’s 
current Contract Clause jurisprudence has stripped the provision of its power, 
states with their own contract impairment clauses are not bound to this 
jurisprudence.161 When interpreting a state constitution’s clause, a state court is 
allowed to have a stricter interpretation than the Supreme Court has for the 
federal clause.162 
In State v. Hempele, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated the well-settled 
rule that the state supreme court, not the U.S. Supreme Court, is the ultimate 
interpreter of a state constitution, and thus, is free to adopt a stricter 
standard.163 
 
 159 See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 427 (“[T]he clause of the Constitution now under consideration was meant 
to foreclose state action impairing the obligation of contracts primarily and especially in respect of such action 
aimed at giving relief to debtors in time of emergency.”). 
 160 See id. at 456–65; Ely, Jr., supra note 99. 
 161 See Wilson Banking Co. Liquidating Corp. v. Colvard, 161 So. 123, 127 (Miss. 1935) (“[D]ecisions of 
the Supreme Court of the United States construing provisions of the federal Constitution are not binding on a 
state court construing similar provisions of its own state constitution.”); see also First Trust Co. of Lincoln v. 
Nebraska, 277 N.W. 762 (Neb. 1938); Commonwealth v. Wilkins, 138 N.E. 11 (Mass. 1923); State v. Chin 
Gim, 224 P. 798 (Nev. 1924). 
 162 See Wilson Banking, 161 So. at 127 (“[D]ecisions of the Supreme Court of the United States 
construing provisions of the federal Constitution are not binding on a state court construing similar provisions 
of its own state constitution.”); see also First Trust Co., 277 N.W. 762 (Neb. 1938); Wilkins, 138 N.E. 11; 
Chin Gim, 224 P. 798. 
 163 See, e.g., 576 A.2d 793, 800 (N.J. 1990); see also Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548  
(Mass. 1985) (applying a standard for probable cause under the Massachusetts constitution that is more strict 
than the federal Constitution’s standard); Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing 
Methodology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Constitutional Rights Adjudication, 72 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1015, 1016 (1997) (“The idea that state courts may interpret their potentially applicable state 
constitutional provisions to provide more, or broader, rights protections than are recognized by the United 
States Supreme Court under the Federal Constitution should no longer be seen as a cute trick or simply flexing 
a state constitutional muscle. It has now become an accepted . . . feature of our jurisprudence.”) (quotation 
marks omitted). 
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In interpreting the New Jersey Constitution, we look for direction to 
the United States Supreme Court, whose opinions can provide 
“valuable sources of wisdom for us.” But although that Court may be 
a polestar that guides us as we navigate the New Jersey Constitution, 
we bear ultimate responsibility for the safe passage of our ship. Our 
eyes must not be so fixed on that star that we risk the welfare of our 
passengers on the shoals of constitutional doctrine. In interpreting the 
New Jersey Constitution, we must look in front of us as well as above 
us.164 
Indeed, several state supreme courts rejected Blaisdell shortly after the 
Supreme Court’s controversial decision.165 Texas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and 
Iowa all struck down mortgage foreclosure moratorium legislation in the 1930s 
as violations of contract clauses in state constitutions.166 
The Nebraska Supreme Court’s decision in First Trust Co. of Lincoln v. 
Smith is particularly useful in considering how state courts should interpret 
their contract impairment clauses.167 In First Trust Co., the court provided a 
blueprint for adopting a stricter contract clause standard in striking down a 
moratorium act similar to the one upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Blaisdell.168 The court noted that under the U.S. Constitution the moratorium 
act would have likely been allowed under the binding precedent of Blaisdell, 
but, unlike an earlier case brought before the Nebraska Supreme Court, the act 
was also challenged under Nebraska’s own constitution.169 Specifically, the act 
was challenged under the contract impairment clause of Nebraska’s 
constitution, which states, “No law . . . impairing the obligations of 
contracts . . . shall be passed.”170 
The court explained that the Nebraska courts are responsible for 
interpreting state’s constitutional provisions.171 The court pointed out that the 
Nebraska Supreme Court’s interpretation of its state constitution has binding 
 
 164 Hempele, 576 A.2d at 800 (Pashman, J., concurring) (quoting State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 
1982)). 
 165 See Ely, Jr., supra note 99, at 390. 
 166 See First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank of Chi. v. Arp., 293 N.W. 441 (Iowa 1939); First Trust Co., 277 
N.W. 762; State ex. rel. Osage Cty. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. Worten, 29 P.2d 1 (Okla. 1934); Travelers’ Ins. Co. 
v. Marshall, 76 S.W.2d 1007 (Tex. 1934).  
 167 277 N.W. at 768–78. 
 168 Id. at 768–70. 
 169 See id. (holding that the statute would still fail under Blaisdell because an emergency situation did not 
exist). 
 170 NEB. CONST. art. I, § 16; see also First Trust Co., 277 N.W. at 764. 
 171 First Trust Co., 277 N.W. at 771–72. 
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effect on the U.S. Supreme Court, just as the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the federal Constitution is binding on the Nebraska Supreme 
Court.172 After the court established this background matter of law, it 
proceeded to reject the Blaisdell standard in its interpretation of the state 
contract impairment clause.173 
The court immediately made it clear that the Nebraska contract clause was 
going to be interpreted more strictly than the federal clause.174 The analysis 
began with the court stating that “[a] principal share of the benefit expected 
from written Constitutions would be lost if the rules they established were so 
flexible as to bend to circumstances or be modified by public opinion.”175 The 
court added: “[A] court or legislature which should allow a change in public 
sentiment to influence it in giving to a written Constitution a construction not 
warranted by the intention of its founders, would be justly chargeable with 
reckless disregard of official oath and public duty.”176 Thus, the court’s goal 
was to look to the original intent and interpretations of the clause, rather than 
the current Supreme Court jurisprudence, to interpret the state provision. 
After considering the early case precedent on the issue and the history 
surrounding the adoption of both the federal and state contract impairment 
clauses, the court determined the act violated the state contract impairment 
clause.177 The court held that public policy did not trump a constitutional 
provision’s original intent, and that the clause was not originally intended to 
allow any emergency exception.178 The fact that the law impaired contractual 
obligations was undisputed in the case.179 The state argued, however, that the 
legislature had the power to impair contractual obligations during periods of 
economic crisis.180 The court rejected the argument, noting that the state’s 
declaration of an emergency did not trigger a police power capable of 
modifying the “effect of constitutional provisions.”181 The court further noted 
 
 172 Id. at 772 (“The United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of this State are peers. The 
decisions of the former upon the Federal constitution and laws are binding on the latter: the decisions of the 
latter upon the constitution and laws of Nebraska are binding on the former.”). 
 173 See id. at 772–78. 
 174 See id. at 772–73. 
 175 Id. at 772. 
 176 Id.  
 177 See id. at 772–78. 
 178 See id. 
 179 Id. at 773 (“That the Nebraska moratorium act impairs the ‘obligation of contracts’ . . . This is 
admitted by appellees, both in their brief and in their argument presented at the bar of this court.”). 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. at 775. 
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that the contract impairment clause was adopted during a time of a financial 
emergency; thus, it would not make sense to alter its meaning because of the 
existence of an emergency.182 
First Trust Co. provides a blueprint for state courts to follow in adopting a 
stricter standard. The court in First Trust Co. did not simply reject the Supreme 
Court’s standard from Blaisdell and adopt a stricter interpretation. Importantly, 
the court made it clear that it had both the authority and precedent to support 
such an interpretation.183 First, the court established that Blaisdell does not 
bind state courts in interpreting a state contract impairment clause.184 Then, the 
court established a stricter standard based on the original interpretations and 
intent of the clause.185 
5. Government Contracts in Particular Should Have a Stricter Standard 
Although state courts clearly have the ability to establish a stricter standard 
of interpretation for their own constitutional contract impairment clauses, the 
courts might still be reluctant to throw out the federally inspired 
jurisprudence.186 However, even if the courts are reluctant to adopt a stricter 
standard in general, they should still adopt one in the context of chapter 9 
bankruptcy. Municipal bankruptcies involve contracts made with a government 
entity. Thus, in authorizing a municipal bankruptcy, a state government 
effectively allows a division of itself to impair its own contractual obligations. 
The Supreme Court has established that this kind of self-interest should inspire 
a heightened level of scrutiny.187 
The Supreme Court addressed the self-interest concern in 1977 in U.S. 
Trust Co. of New York.188 Despite the Court’s continuing acceptance of the 
relaxed standard from Blaisdell, in U.S. Trust Co. of New York, it 
acknowledged that “some limits remain on state abrogation of contracts.”189 In 
 
 182 Id. at 777 (“The Constitution was adopted in a period of grave emergency. Its grants of power to the 
federal government and its limitations of the power of the States were determined in the light of emergency, 
and they are not altered by emergency.”) (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425 
(1934)). 
 183 See id. at 772–78. 
 184 See id. at 771–72. 
 185 See id. at 772–78. 
 186 See First Trust Co., 277 N.W. 762; State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1990); First Trust Joint 
Stock Land Bank of Chi. v. Arp., 293 N.W. 441 (Iowa 1939). 
 187 See U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1977). 
 188 Id. at 16–32. 
 189 Id. at 16; VOLOKH, OVERPROTECTING PUBLIC, supra note 98. 
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U.S. Trust Co., the state of New Jersey had repealed a covenant among itself, 
New York, and “the holders of any affected bonds.”190 The Court held that the 
repeal violated the Contract Clause.191 Importantly, the Court noted the special 
circumstance of a government impairing its own contractual agreement and 
chose not to defer to the state legislature as it had in the past.192 The Court held 
that “complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and 
necessity” would be inappropriate because “the [s]tate’s self-interest [was] at 
stake.”193 The Court went on to say: “[i]f a State could reduce its financial 
obligations whenever it wanted to spend the money for what it regarded as an 
important public purpose, the Contract Clause would provide no protection at 
all.”194 
While the Court did not adopt a particularly strict standard for government 
impairment of its own contracts in U.S. Trust Co. of New York, the case 
provides a basis for state courts to adopt such a standard.195 U.S. Trust Co. of 
New York did not overrule Bekins, and, therefore, chapter 9 authorization is 
still considered constitutional under the U.S. Constitution.196 However, U.S. 
Trust Co. of New York recognizes the need to strictly scrutinize contract 
impairment by a self-interested government.197 The case supports the 
proposition that a “[s]tate cannot refuse to meet its legitimate financial 
obligations simply because it would prefer to spend the money to promote the 
public good rather than the private welfare of its creditors.”198 
Thus, state courts should adopt a stricter interpretation of state 
constitutions’ contract impairment clauses in the context of chapter 9 
bankruptcy, even if courts are not willing to adopt a stricter standard more 
generally. While municipal bankruptcy authorization could potentially be in 
the best interest of the public, it would come at the cost of creditors of a state’s 
subdivisions. As the Supreme Court in U.S. Trust Co. of New York asserts, a 
state should not be allowed to dodge its financial obligations to creditors 
 
 190 U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 at 17–18. 
 191 Id. at 32. 
 192 Id. at 27–28. 
 193 Id. at 26. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. at 25–26 (holding the impairment is still constitutional if it is reasonable and necessary to promote 
a legitimate public purpose, but not giving deference to the legislature on either prong). 
 196 United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 52–54 (1938); U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 26.  
 197 U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 29–31. 
 198 Id. at 29. 
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simply to “promote the public good.”199 In the words of the Court: “A 
governmental entity can always find use for extra money, especially when 
taxes do not have to be raised.”200 
C. Chapter 9 Authorization Is Inconsistent with a Strict Contract Clause 
Standard 
Now that it has been established that state courts need to adopt a stricter 
standard for their constitutions’ contract impairment clauses, the next step is to 
consider exactly what that standard should look like. The early decisions of the 
Supreme Court provide the best guidance to state courts on how to apply a 
strict standard.201 While the early decisions do not create a crystal clear test, 
they definitively establish that a strict standard would prohibit state chapter 9 
authorizations to the extent that they would allow for contract impairment. 
1. Establishing a Strict Standard 
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court originally interpreted the 
Contract Clause quite strictly.202 State courts, then, can look to the early 
decisions of the Court to determine what a stricter standard should look like. 
What should first be noted about the early Supreme Court cases is that “even 
during its heyday” the Contract Clause “was not read with literal exactness.”203 
Thus, while reading a state’s contract impairment clause as an absolute bar to 
any contract impairment is certainly a possibility, it is not necessarily what a 
stricter standard demands. 
In his dissent in Blaisdell, Justice Sutherland recounted much of the 
Court’s Contract Clause jurisprudence prior to that decision and the Contract 
Clause’s original understanding.204 He came to two very important and clear 
conclusions: (1) the Contract Clause “was framed to bar the states from 
granting debtor relief at the expense of creditors in periods of economic 
distress”; and (2) an emergency could not “justify ignoring the restrictions of 
the Contract Clause on the states.”205 Justice Sutherland noted that prior to 
 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. at 26. 
 201 See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 464–72 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting); 
Ely, Jr., supra note 99, at 376–81. 
 202 See id. at 455–72; Ely, Jr., supra note 99, at 376. 
 203 Ely, Jr., supra note 99, at 376.  
 204 See 290 U.S. at 450–72 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
 205 Ely, Jr., supra note 99, at 390; see also Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 465–72 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
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Blaisdell when states had attempted to get around the Contract Clause for 
either of those reasons, the Court had consistently struck down the 
legislation.206 He wrote: 
The vital lesson . . . that public or private extravagance, financed by 
promises to pay, either must end in complete or partial repudiation or 
the promises be fulfilled by self-denial and painful effort, though 
constantly taught by bitter experience, seems never to be learned; and 
the attempt by legislative devices to shift the misfortune of the debtor 
to the shoulders of the creditor without coming into conflict with the 
contract impairment clause has been persistent and oft-repeated.207 
What then would a stricter standard based on the original understanding 
and Supreme Court interpretations look like? Justice Sutherland’s dissent 
shows that at the very least it would prohibit a state from passing legislation 
that impairs contractual obligations in order to relieve the debtors of their 
liabilities at their creditors’ expense.208 This Contract Clause protection is not 
diminished because of the presence of an emergency,209 and it should only be 
heightened when the debtor is the government.210 
Accordingly, the test under a stricter standard should only have two prongs. 
First, does the state action actually impair a contractual obligation? This is a 
threshold question that must first be established; otherwise, it would be 
improper to apply the contract impairment clause in the first place. The 
strictest standard would end after this threshold question. However, as 
discussed earlier in this Comment, even in early precedent where the Contract 
Clause was at its strongest within the courts, the clause was still not necessarily 
read as absolute.211 Such a strict textualist approach would have little 
precedential support and might even be inconsistent with the original 
interpretations and understanding of the Contract Clause.212  
Thus, if the courts find impairment of a contractual obligation, the inquiry 
must probably go a step further. Specifically, the Court’s stricter standard 
focused on the purpose of the impairment, and its consistency with the original 
 
 206 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 464–72 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
 207 Id. at 471–72. 
 208 See id. 
 209 See id. at 471–74. 
 210 See U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 51–56 (1977). 
 211 Ely, Jr., supra note 99, at 376. 
 212 See id. 
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interpretations and understanding of the clause.213 Thus, the second prong is to 
establish the purpose of the impairment. If the purpose of the impairment is 
inconsistent with the purpose of the clause, then it fails the test. 
While this test is simple to articulate, it may be much more complicated in 
application. But it has already been established that a law passed to relieve 
debtors of their liabilities at their creditors’ expense does not serve a valid 
purpose, and that alone is sufficient to prevent state authorization of most 
municipal bankruptcies.214 
2. Applying the Strict Standard to Chapter 9 Authorization 
Application of this standard to chapter 9 authorization, then, requires a  
two-part inquiry: (1) Does the authorization impair contractual obligations? 
And (2) what is the purpose of the impairments? If authorizing a municipal 
bankruptcy impairs contractual obligations, then it must be for an acceptable 
purpose consistent with the clause’s purpose. That purpose cannot be granting 
relief to debtors at their creditors’ expense, even in the case of an emergency, 
and especially in the case of government contractual obligations.215 
The first prong of this test is satisfied because courts should either find that 
authorizing municipal bankruptcies actually impairs contractual obligations or 
they should presume that it would. By authorizing a municipal bankruptcy, the 
state is opening the doors for municipalities to impair contractual obligations. 
With the state’s authorization secured, the municipality is free to enter into 
bankruptcy, assuming it meets the other chapter 9 eligibility requirements.216 
Prior to the authorization, the municipality’s creditors have a right to keep their 
contracts from being impaired.217 Once the municipality enters into bankruptcy 
though, it is no longer limited by the contract impairment clause.218 Thus, after 
the state authorization, the creditors lose that very important right. Courts 
could consider such a loss of rights as an impairment derived directly from 
state authorization of a municipal bankruptcy. 
 
 213 See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 464–71 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
 214 See id. at 471–73. 
 215 See id. at 471–72; U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 55–56. 
 216 See, e.g., Ass’n of Retired Emp. v. City of Stockton (In re City of Stockton), 478 B.R. 8, 16  
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012). 
 217 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No . . . law impairing the 
obligation of contract shall be enacted.”). 
 218 See, e.g., City of Stockton, 478 B.R. at 16. 
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Even if state courts refuse to accept that the authorization is an actual 
impairment, they should still presume that authorizing a municipal bankruptcy 
will impair contractual obligations. Bankruptcy courts have consistently 
acknowledged that contracts are most likely going to be impaired during a 
chapter 9 bankruptcy.219 Bankruptcy courts have also had no problem 
expressly permitting such impairment to occur.220 As Judge Klein wrote in his 
opinion in In re City of Stockton, contract impairment has a “starring role” in 
bankruptcy proceedings.221 Judge Klein went so far as to claim that “every 
discharge impairs contracts.”222 At least one bankruptcy court has even made it 
a requirement that the municipality’s adjustment of debts impairs or modifies 
its debts in some way.223 
Still, most jurisdictions do not require impairment of debts, and it is 
theoretically possible for a municipality to file bankruptcy and not impair 
contractual obligations.224 For example, if after filing for bankruptcy the 
municipality received a large amount of money from its own debtors, it could 
have enough to pay all of its creditors. If that were to occur, though, 
bankruptcy would no longer be necessary for the municipality, and the case 
would be dismissed, as the municipality would no longer meet the insolvency 
requirement of chapter 9.225  
Another theoretical possibility is that a municipality could file bankruptcy 
without having any contractual obligations. If the municipality has no 
contractual obligations but has developed significant non-contractual debt, 
such as a tort judgment, then the bankruptcy proceedings would not be within 
the scope of any contract impairment clauses. However, for this to be the case 
the municipality must have absolutely no contractual obligations because even 
the smallest amount would create a possible impairment and violation of the 
contract clause. Therefore, state courts should presume that all chapter 9 
bankruptcies will impair contractual obligations but allow municipalities an 
opportunity to rebut this presumption. In the rare event that municipalities have 
 
 219 See, e.g., id.; In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 191, 247 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
 220 See, e.g., City of Stockton, 478 B.R. at 16; City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 246–48. 
 221 City of Stockton, 478 B.R. at 16. 
 222 Id. 
 223 See In re Town of Westlake, 211 B.R. 860, 867 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997); see also 6 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 28, at ¶ 900.02. 
 224 See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 28, at ¶ 900.02. 
 225 See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3) (2012); see also 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 28, at ¶ 900.02. 
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no contractual obligations, state courts could allow the bankruptcy to 
proceed.226 
The issue in this Comment, though, is whether the authorization of a 
chapter 9 bankruptcy will impair contractual obligations, not a chapter 9 
bankruptcy itself. Once state courts presume that all chapter 9 bankruptcies 
will impair contractual obligations, they should also take the next step to 
presume that chapter 9 authorization also impairs contractual obligations. 
Although the authorization itself may not necessarily impair contractual 
obligations because it is possible that no municipalities ever actually file for 
bankruptcy, there is no reason for courts to treat the authorization differently 
from the filing. It has already been established that courts should presume that 
all chapter 9 bankruptcies will impair contractual obligations, and, therefore, 
filing for chapter 9 should be a presumed impairment. If courts make this 
finding, then chapter 9 authorization by the state is meaningless because 
municipalities are already barred from filing. 
Furthermore, the rationale behind the presumption for filing applies equally 
to authorization. Once a municipality has filed for bankruptcy under state 
authorization, federal law trumps the state constitution.227 As discussed in the 
Background section of this Comment, the state constitution does not limit 
federal bankruptcy power.228 The state court can no longer enforce the state 
contract impairment clause once the state has authorized the chapter 9 filing, 
other than by finding the authorization itself as an impairment.229 If the state 
court does not presume chapter 9 authorization impairs contractual obligations, 
the court will simply be allowing the state to sidestep its constitution and, thus, 
significantly strip it of its power. Again, however unlikely it may be, 
theoretically a municipality could have no contractual obligations, and its 
bankruptcy would fall outside the scope of states’ contract clauses.230 Courts, 
then, must allow states the opportunity to rebut the presumption of impairment 
by showing the authorization only applies to the municipalities without 
contractual obligations. Importantly though, while this opportunity to rebut 
 
 226 See Michael S. Reich, Ten Guidelines to Municipal Contracts, ILL. MUN. REV., Jan. 1987, at 7, 
http://www.lib.niu.edu/1987/im870107.html (explaining that in Illinois all municipalities enter into numerous 
contracts every year). 
 227 County of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re County of Orange), 191 B.R. 1005, 1021  
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996). 
 228 See, e.g., Ass’n of Retired Emp. v. City of Stockton (In re City of Stockton), 478 B.R. 8, 16  
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012). 
 229 See, e.g., id. 
 230 See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. I, § 10 (prohibiting the impairment of contract obligations). 
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must exist, in practice “[e]ven the smallest . . . municipalities enter into scores 
of contracts each year.”231 
The threshold question of contractual impairment is satisfied, then, as long 
as the municipality has any contractual obligations, and the question becomes 
whether the purpose of the impairment is permissible.232 This second prong is a 
two-part process. First, the purpose of the impairment must be established, and 
only then can the court determine whether the purpose justifies the impairment. 
Again, the impairment here is the state’s authorization of a municipal 
bankruptcy, and therefore, the next step is to establish the state’s purpose in 
authorizing a municipal bankruptcy. 
It can be safely assumed that the primary purpose of authorizing a 
municipal bankruptcy is to allow the municipality to gain the benefits of filing 
bankruptcy. Thus, the inquiry in this instance should focus predominantly on 
the purpose of a municipality entering into bankruptcy. Collier on Bankruptcy 
states that the purpose of chapter 9 is “to permit a financially distressed public 
entity to seek protection from its creditors while it formulates and negotiates a 
plan for adjustment of its debts.”233 Importantly though, it also states the 
purpose is “to provide the mechanism by which the plan that is acceptable to 
the majority of creditors can be made binding on a recalcitrant and dissenting 
minority.”234 The purpose, then, is not only to protect the municipality from 
creditors while it negotiates with creditors, but also to give the municipality the 
ability to force creditors to renegotiate and accept contracts.235 
These two primary purposes stated in Collier on Bankruptcy work to do 
exactly what Justice Sutherland’s dissent made clear would not be acceptable: 
passing the misfortunes of a debtor onto the shoulders of its creditors.236 The 
ability to keep creditors from taking action to recover from the municipality 
takes away the creditors’ right to recover for the benefit of the indebted 
municipality. Furthermore, the ability to force creditors to accept a plan, even 
if they do not wish to accept the agreements, takes away creditors’ freedom to 
contract because of the municipality’s need to cut its debts.  
 
 231 Reich, supra note 226. 
 232 See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 465–72 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
 233 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 28, at ¶ 900.01. 
 234 Id. 
 235 See id. 
 236 See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 471–72 (Sutherland, J., dissenting); 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 
28, at ¶ 900.01. 
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To be fair, one could argue that most contract impairments will benefit one 
party at the expense of another; however, this standard is not impossible to 
pass. For example, if a state were to pass a law prohibiting the sale of alcohol 
and invalidating any contract for such sale, state courts would have little 
grounds to conclude the law’s primary purpose is to pass a debtor’s 
misfortunes onto his creditors. The alcohol contracts would obviously be 
impaired, in fact destroyed, but prior to the passage of the law, the debtor (the 
alcohol producer) presumably had no misfortunes to pass to his creditors (the 
alcohol purchasers). The law would create misfortune. Thus, it would be 
illogical to argue that the purpose of the law was to pass along the debtor’s 
misfortunes. It is clear, then, that this standard does not create an absolute bar 
to contract impairment, but it is also clear that the standard presents a bar to 
municipal bankruptcy authorization. 
A look at Detroit’s recent bankruptcy provides a real world example of a 
municipality shifting its misfortunes onto its debtors through the bankruptcy 
process.237 At the height of its prosperity in 1952, the city of Detroit produced 
about half of the world’s cars and had approximately 1,850,000 residents.238 
The city’s population has now fallen below 700,000 residents, and its 
employment and revenue levels have dwindled.239 These circumstances “led to 
decaying infrastructure, excessive borrowing, mounting crime rates, spreading 
blight, and a deteriorating quality of life.”240 Detroit lacks the resources to 
provide “basic police, fire and emergency medical services” to its residents.241 
All of this is to say that Detroit entered bankruptcy dealing with some very 
serious misfortunes. 
Judge Rhodes stated in his opinion that the city needed help from the 
bankruptcy court to reverse its decline and “reinvigorate itself.”242 By filing for 
bankruptcy, the city did not just get help with its financial situation; it directly 
passed its misfortune onto its creditors. Among Detroit’s many debts, the city 
had a $5.7 billion unsecured debt for the Health and Life Insurance Benefit 
Plan and the Supplemental Death Benefit Plan and $3.5 billion of unfunded 
pension obligations.243 Under the Michigan constitution, those pension 
 
 237 See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 191, 193–94 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013); Walsh, Detroit Emerges, 
supra note 4, at B1. 
 238 City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 193. 
 239 Id. at 194. 
 240 Id. at 193. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id. at 194. 
 243 Id. 
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obligations could not be impaired, but the bankruptcy court made clear that 
once the city entered into bankruptcy those pensions were no longer 
protected.244 Ultimately, the retirees accepted a plan with “reductions to their 
monthly checks and other cutbacks.”245 The pensioners lost both their rights 
and money through the bankruptcy, and yet most considered them to have 
made out quite well compared to the other creditors.246 Bondholders, for 
example, fared much worse in the bankruptcy.247 With their contracts open to 
impairment, unlimited-tax general obligation bondholders took a 26% cut and 
limited-tax general obligation bondholders took a 66% cut.248 
Bondholders and pensioners both had rights to repayment stripped away 
through the bankruptcy proceedings and then had to make deals with the city 
diminishing their rights.249 The help that the bankruptcy provided Detroit was 
the ability to strip away the bondholders’ and pensioners’ rights as creditors.250 
Bankruptcy courts take away the rights of creditors in order to fulfill the two 
stated purposes of a municipal bankruptcy from Collier on Bankruptcy.251 The 
Detroit bankruptcy shows that when these purposes are played out, it becomes 
quite clear that they violate a stricter standard like the one established in this 
Comment. 
D. Policy of Upholding Constitution Trumps Policy of Supporting Municipal 
Bankruptcy 
If state courts consider policy in their decisions, then they might be tempted 
to primarily consider the soundness of a policy in support of municipal 
bankruptcies; however, while state courts may consider the policy of municipal 
bankruptcies, that consideration should be given much less weight than the 
implications of its constitutional interpretation. It is not the place of courts to 
determine whether authorization of municipal bankruptcies is a sound 
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policy.252 It is the purpose of courts, however, to uphold the constitutions of 
their respective states.253 Therefore, this Comment does not attempt to 
determine the soundness of municipal bankruptcy as a policy decision because 
it is obviously trumped by the courts’ policy of upholding their 
constitutions.254 As Justice Sutherland stated, “The only legitimate inquiry we 
can make is whether it is constitutional. If it is not, its virtues . . . if it have any, 
cannot save it; if it is, its faults cannot be invoked to accomplish its 
destruction.”255 
In any event, the wisdom of municipal bankruptcy as a policy matter is far 
from clear.256 The history of political battles around municipal bankruptcies 
shows that it is often a contested policy decision.257 States have multiple 
options when it comes to insolvent municipalities. Other than authorizing 
municipal bankruptcy, a state could also choose to pass other legislation to 
assist financially troubled municipalities. Importantly, a state could pass 
legislation that would help an insolvent municipality without confronting its 
contract impairment clause. States have several legislative options such as 
bailouts, receiverships, consolidations, and debt limits.258 
For example, in Georgia where municipalities are not authorized to file for 
bankruptcy, cities are not left merely to fend for themselves in times of severe 
financial distress.259 The state may not be able to authorize a municipal 
bankruptcy, but it could aid a municipality in other manners such as providing 
emergency funds.260 In fact, state bailouts are “the most popular solution to 
municipal insolvency.”261 Legislatures may also choose to enact receivership 
or emergency manager statutes that would allow a state or a state-appointed 
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official to take control of municipal finances.262 The state of Pennsylvania 
appointed a receiver to run Harrisburg after the city’s bankruptcy case was 
dismissed.263 Under the control of the receiver, the city negotiated a deal that 
paid off and restructured its $600 million of debt.264 States also have the power 
to dissolve a municipality and consolidate it with nearby local governments.265 
States could also take proactive action to keep its municipalities out of 
financial trouble by passing debt limits.266 By strictly limiting the amount of 
debt a municipality can hold, a state significantly reduces the chances that any 
of its municipalities will reach a financial crisis stage.267 
Thus, it is clear that states have alternatives to municipal bankruptcy 
authorization.268 The purpose here is not to argue that these alternatives are 
more effective means of aiding financially distressed municipalities; the point 
here is simply that policy decisions should not trump a constitutional 
provision.269 The real policy question for courts to consider is whether a policy 
matter such as municipal bankruptcy should be able to trump the clear meaning 
of a constitutional provision. State courts are setting a dangerous precedent that 
significantly devalues their constitutions if they answer that question in the 
affirmative. 
The Nebraska Supreme Court wisely stated in its decision rejecting 
Blaisdell that “a limitation . . . expressed in the terms of a Constitution . . . [is] 
the exercise of the sovereign power,” and cannot be “modified or in any 
manner controlled . . . by a state governmental agency . . . if the power it seeks 
to exercise . . . is in any manner inconsistent with the express terms of the state 
Constitution.”270 The ultimate “sovereign power” rests not in the states but in 
the people who, acting in their collective capacity, create, empower, and limit 
the government through constitutions.271 By allowing a state government to 
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exceed its constitutional limits, courts disrespect the sovereignty of the people 
of their respective states. State courts should instead respect both the powers 
and limitations the people have placed on government. Contract impairment 
clauses are a sovereign exercise of the people, and they were clearly meant to 
apply in municipal bankruptcy situations. Thus, the correct policy decision for 
state courts is to respect and uphold their constitutions even if it prohibits a 
program that many find effective. As Justice Sutherland stated in the final 
paragraph of his Blaisdell dissent, “If the provisions of the Constitution be not 
upheld when they pinch as well as when they comfort, they may as well be 
abandoned.”272 
CONCLUSION 
State courts should not allow the Contract Clause jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court to be a tool to devalue their own constitutions. Contract 
impairment clauses were clearly meant to have a stricter standard than they 
have today.273 The Contract Clause and state contract impairment clauses 
should have never allowed states to enact laws that would relieve the debtors 
of their debts at the expense of their creditors.274 Yet, municipal bankruptcy 
does just that and, in the Supreme Court’s eyes, remains perfectly consistent 
with the federal Contract Clause.275 Fortunately, the Court’s precedent does not 
bind state courts when interpreting their own contract impairment clauses.276 
For the sake of their own constitutions, state courts need to give their contract 
impairment clauses the interpretation they were intended to have even though 
that would require them to strike down any law authorizing or permitting the 
authorization of a chapter 9 bankruptcy filing. State courts would not only 
rescue their states’ contract impairment clauses from a flawed jurisprudence by 
holding as such, but they would also uphold the integrity of their states’ 
constitutions. 
Importantly, state courts can accomplish this feat without dooming their 
states because states with contract impairment clauses in their constitutions 
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have several viable alternatives to authorizing chapter 9 filings. For example, 
states could appoint emergency managers, establish debt limits, and distribute 
emergency bailouts.277 If states determine that those methods will not be 
sufficient and still wish to open the doors of chapter 9 bankruptcy to their 
municipalities, there is another simple solution. States can always amend their 
constitutions to either remove the contract impairment clause or provide an 
express exemption for chapter 9 bankruptcy. 
Unlike the U.S. Constitution, state constitutions are frequently amended.278 
Research has shown that “there have been almost 150 state constitutions, they 
have been amended roughly 12,000 times, and the text of the constitutions and 
their amendments comprises about 15,000 pages of text.”279 Furthermore, 
almost every state allows its legislature to propose an amendment for 
ratification.280 Thus, legislatures do not even have to wait for the citizens of 
their states to initiate the amendment process; if they want to allow 
municipalities to have access to chapter 9, they can begin the amendment 
process themselves. This is not to say that amending state constitutions is 
necessarily an easy solution, but this is the only approach that would allow 
states to enact their desired policy without coming into conflict with their 
contract impairment clauses. 
Given recent trends, municipal bankruptcy filings should be expected to 
grow in both quantity and scale in coming years.281 The history of municipal 
bankruptcies also suggests that filings are going to face more and more legal 
challenges, and although this state contract impairment clause issue has not yet 
faced many state courts, they will likely face it head on in the near future. In 
considering the issue, state courts will not only decide a matter of bankruptcy 
policy; more importantly, they will decide constitutional policy. By striking 
down laws authorizing or permitting the authorization of chapter 9 
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courts can make an emphatic statement that the clauses still carry the force 
they were intended to have. 
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